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NOTE 
TAKING A CLOSER LOOK AT 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT: 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S 
MATERIALITY ANALYSIS IN 
HAYES V. BROWN AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS 
Nowhere in the Constitution or in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, nor for that matter in the Federalist or in any 
other writing of the Founding Fathers, can one find a single 
utterance that could justify the decision by any oath-
beholden servant of the law to look the other way when con-
fronted by the real possibility of being complicit in the 
wrongful use of false evidence to secure a conviction in 
court. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two decades, an alarming number of wrong-
ful convictions have been overturned, primarily as a result of 
successful exonerations by the Innocence Project.2 In a survey 
1 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 988 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting N. Marianna Is· 
lands v. Bowie, 236 F. 3d 1083, 1096 (9th Cir. 2001». 
2 See The Innocence Project, http://innocenceproject.org (last visited Aug. 10, 
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of the causes of wrongful convictions, prosecutorial misconduct 
was listed as a cause in nearly half of the cases.3 In twenty-five 
percent of those cases, the type of misconduct was the knowing 
use of false testimony.4 Perjured testimony in general, particu-
larly by cooperating witnesses, has been another major cause of 
these terrible injustices.5 
The prosecutor's actions in Hayes v. Brown6 illustrate how 
this type of prosecutorial misconduct can lead to wrongful con-
victions. By presenting false evidence and misleading the 
judge, jury, and opposing counsel, the prosecution enhanced 
the credibility of its key witness. 7 By providing inducements to 
this accomplice witness, the prosecutor gave him a significant 
incentive to lie-an incentive about which the jury was not 
fully informed. 8 Blufford Hayes was convicted and sentenced 
to death as a result. 9 Although this case may not be one of fac-
tual innocence, Hayes illustrates how a prosecutor's unethical 
conduct resulted in a tainted and unjust trial. 
This note argues that the Ninth Circuit's meaningful fac-
tual analysis in applying the materiality standard led to its re-
versal of Mr. Hayes's conviction. The Court's willingness to 
look beyond the Government's assertions and to take into ac-
count every way in which the prosecutor's duplicitous conduct 
might have affected the jury's verdict allowed it to reach a dif-
ferent decision than prior reviewing courts. Moreover, the 
Court did so while adhering to established Supreme Court 
precedent and remaining within the confines of modern federal 
habeas review.1° The Ninth Circuit's analysis under this stan-
dard can help prevent wrongful convictions by deterring prose-
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in 1992. It has since expanded into the national 
Innocence Network and has exonerated over 160 people. 
3 See The Innocence Project, http://innocenceproject.org/causes/ (last visited 
Aug. 10, 2006) (finding thirty-three of the seventy-four DNA exonerations surveyed 
were caused by prosecutorial misconduct). 
4 See id. 
5 See id (finding fourteen of the seventy-four DNA exonerations were caused by 
the perjury of accomplices and snitches); see also Steven Clark, Procedural Reforms in 
Capital Cases Applied to Perjury, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 453, 453 (2001) (finding the 
most common cause of capital wrongful convictions in Illinois is perjury) . 
. 6 See generally Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972. 
7Id. at 985-86. 
S See id. at 979. 
9Id. at 977. 
10 See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 270 (1959); Giglio v. United States, 405 
U.S. 150, 154 (1972); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,412 (2000). 
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cutorial misconduct and encouraging prosecutors to take care 
in using the bargained-for testimony of accomplice witnesses. 
Further, the Court's holding can lead to reversals of wrongful 
convictions by instructing other courts to engage in meaningful 
reviews of such claims. 
Part I of this note provides the background on the evolu-
tion of the materiality standard and its application in modern 
federal habeas review.l 1 Part II fully describes the facts, pro-
cedural history, and holdings in the Hayes case.l2 Part III ana-
lyzes how the Ninth Circuit reached its conclusion to reverse 
Mr. Hayes's conviction through its application of the material-
ity standard.l3 Further, this Part outlines how this depth of 
analysis can help reverse and prevent wrongful convictions 
caused by prosecutorial misconduct and false testimony.l4 Part 
IV concludes that to preserve the integrity of the criminal jus-
tice system, state misconduct must not go unchecked, as it has 
been shown to lead to the convictions of innocent persons. 15 
1. BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court has long disapproved of prosecutors 
employing deceptive means to obtain convictions.l6 By 1935, 
the Court had recognized that a State's use of false evidence of-
fended the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.l7 Subsequently, the Court established that a 
prosecutor's failure to correct false testimony was unconstitu-
tional.18 The landmark cases of Napue v. Illinois and Brady v. 
Maryland held that reversal was required for non-disclosure of 
evidence or for the use of false testimony only if it affected the 
outcome of the trial. 19 This principle would become known as 
the "materiality" standard, a second inquiry after establishing 
a violation of a defendant's due process rights.20 Other Su-
11 See infra notes 16-70 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 71-149 and accompanying text_ 
13 See infra notes 150-185 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 186-206 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 207-209 and accompanying text. 
16 See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1935). 
17 See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV. 
18 See Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1957). 
19 See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 270 (1959); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83, 87 (1963). 
20 See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); United States v. 
3
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preme Court and Ninth Circuit decisions provide guidance on 
what factors determine whether false evidence is "material" 
and what circumstances warrant reversal.21 
A. EARLY SUPREME COURT CASES ADDRESSING 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND THE USE OF FALSE 
EVIDENCE 
The Supreme Court first granted relief for the use of false 
testimony by a prosecutor in Mooney v. Holohan. 22 There, the 
defendant alleged that the prosecution had used false testi-
mony to obtain his conviction and death sentence.23 Further, 
he contended that the prosecutor withheld evidence that would 
have exposed the perjury.24 In rejecting the Government's nar-
row view of due process requirements, the Court held the 
State's knowing use of false testimony was "inconsistent with 
the rudimentary demands of justice," and hence, unconstitu-
tiona1.25 
Seven years later, in Pyle v. Kansas, the Court held that 
suppression of evidence favorable to the accused was sufficient 
to create constitutional error.26 There, a prosecutor coerced a 
witness to testify falsely.27 After being convicted, the defen-
dant obtained written statements from both the witness and 
the prosecutor admitting to the perjury and stating that the 
trial had been unfair. 28 The Court reversed, holding that these 
allegations indicated that defendant's constitutional rights had 
been violated.29 
Further, in Alcorta v. Texas, the Supreme Court an-
nounced that prosecutors have an independent duty to correct 
information they know to be false. 3D There, the defendant had 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 2005). 
21 See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154; Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103; United States v. Bagley, 
473 U.S. 667, 684 (1985). 
22 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 115 (1935). 
23Id. at 110. 
24Id. 
25Id. at 112. 
26 Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1942). 
27Id. at 214. 
28Id. at 215. 
29Id. at 216. 
30 Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 32 (1957). See also Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 
264, 269 (1959) (recognizing rule); Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2005) 
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argued he killed his wife in the heat of passion when he saw 
her kissing another man.31 Prior to calling the man the prose-
cutor instructed him not to testify that he had had intercourse 
with defendant's wife unless he was asked explicitly.32 The 
witness then testified that he had not had relations with de-
fendant's wife.33 The Court found that the prosecutor's failure 
to correct the false testimony violated due process.34 In revers-
ing the defendant's conviction and death sentence, the Court 
reasoned that had the jury heard about the affair, it might 
have accepted defendant's heat of passion defense.35 Therefore, 
although the Court had yet to coin the term "materiality," it 
had begun to consider the impact of the constitutional violation 
on the outcome of the defendant's trial in reaching its decision. 
B. THE MODERN CASES GOVERNING REVERSAL FOR 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
THE MATERIALITY STANDARD: NAPUE AND BRADY 
In the seminal case regarding a prosecutor's use of false 
testimony, Napue v. Illinois, the Court announced the circum-
stances and standards that warranted reversa1.36 Napue in-
volved false testimony that went to the credibility of a key 
prosecution witness.37 The witness testified that he had not re-
ceived a sentence reduction for his testimony and the prosecu-
tor failed to correct his statement.3S In reversing, the Court 
reasoned that credibility evidence pertaining to a key witness 
was sufficient to warrant reversal under those circumstances.39 
In addition, it held that although the jury had heard other evi-
dence about the witness' credibility, the outcome still might 
have been different had the jury known about the sentence re-
duction.40 This case established the test for materiality that 
the Ninth Circuit applied in Hayes: a new trial is required "if 
(same). 
31 Alcorta, 355 U.S. at 28-29. 
32 [d. at 31. 
33 [d. at 29. 
34 [d. 
35 [d. at 32. 
36 See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 264 (1959). 
37 [d. at 267. 
38 [d. 
39 [d. at 269. 
40 [d. at 270. 
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the false testimony could ... in any reasonable likelihood have 
affected the judgment of the jury."41 Moreover, the Napue 
Court identified three important factors in applying this stan-
dard: (1) the nature of the false evidence, (2) the importance of 
the witness to the prosecution's case, and (3) whether the evi-
dence was cumulative.42 
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court recognized an-
other form of prosecutorial misconduct as unconstitutional: the 
failure to disclose evidence favorable to the defense.43 The 
Court held that reversal for nondisclosure of evidence was 
warranted regardless of whether the prosecutor had intention-
ally withheld the evidence.44 However, the Court also held that 
defendant's due process rights are violated only "where the evi-
dence is material either to guilt or to punishment."45 Subse-
quent cases would clarify that what constituted "material" evi-
dence depended on whether or not the prosecutor's misconduct 
was intentiona1.46 
C. POST NAPUEI BRADY APPLICATION OF THE MATERIALITY 
STANDARD UNDER MODERN FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW 
1. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit Cases 
Recent cases have interpreted the materiality standards 
set forth in Napue and Brady. For instance, Giglio v. United 
States reaffirmed Napue, holding that the use of false testi-
mony relating to credibility was sufficient to warrant a rever-
sal.47 There, defendant alleged both the prosecution's nondis-
closure of immunity given to a key witness and the use of false 
testimony.48 The Court emphasized that materiality often 
turned on the importance of the witness' credibility to which 
the suppressed evidence relates: "[w]hen the 'reliability of a 
41Id. at 271·72; Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 989 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tallman, J., 
dissenting). 
42 See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 2~9.70 (1959). 
43 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (citing Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 
213, 213 (1942». 
44 Id. 
45Id. 
46 See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); United States v. Agurs, 
427 U.S. 97, 103·04 (1976). 
47 Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154. 
48Id. at 150-51. 
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given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' 
nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this 
general rule [of materiality]."49 The Court further noted in 
United States v. Bagley that it has consistently refused to dis-
tinguish between exculpatory and impeachment evidence in de-
termining materiality.50 
In United States v. Agurs, the Supreme Court held that dif-
ferent standards of materiality applied depending on whether 
or not the prosecutor knowingly used the false evidence. 51 It 
reasoned that Napue's "any reasonable likelihood" standard is 
a lower standard of materiality that should apply only when a 
state knowingly presents false evidence to the jury.52 The 
Agurs Court explained that this standard was appropriate in 
such cases "not just because they involve prosecutorial miscon-
duct, but more importantly because they involve a corruption of 
the truth-seeking process."53 Therefore, courts are more likely 
to find a violation material when false evidence is used inten-
tionally rather than inadvertently. 54 Finally, the Agurs Court 
also implied that this standard was implicated when a prosecu-
tor knew or should have known that the testimony was false. 55 
However, the circuits are split on this proposition.56 
Among the cases in which the Ninth Circuit has applied 
Napue's standard,57 Benn v. Lambert discussed the issue of 
cumulative impeachment in determining materiality. 58 There, 
the Court found Brady error for the prosecutor's knowing fail-
ure to disclose damaging evidence relating to the credibility of 
49Id. at 154 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959». 
50 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675·76 (1985) (citing Giglio v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972». 
51 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). 
52 Id. at 103. 
53Id. at 104. 
54Id. 
55Id. at 103. 
56 See Aron E. Goldschneider, Edict v. Dicta: Rolling Back Rights in the Second 
Circuit under the Clearly Established Clause of the AEDPA Amended Habeas Statute, 
26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 49 (2005) [hereinafter Goldschneider] (finding that the First, 
Second, Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have recognized the "should have 
known" standard, while the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eleventh Circuits require actual 
knowledge). 
57 See, e.g., Belmontes v. Woodford, 350 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 S. 
Ct. 1697 (2005); N. Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 236 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2001). 
58 Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1054·1059 (9th Cir. 2002). 
7
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a key prosecution witness.59 The Court rejected the argument 
that the suppressed evidence was cumulative because the 
prosecution had disclosed some impeachment evidence pertain-
ing to the witness.6o It reasoned that while some impeachment 
evidence was disclosed, this did not render all undisclosed evi-
dence cumulative.61 
2. The Materiality Standard in Other Circuits 
The application of the materiality standard varies among 
the circuits. While some have applied the standard set forth in 
Napue and Giglio in the broad manner advocated by the Ninth 
Circuit in Hayes, other circuits have been more reluctant. For 
example, the Second Circuit has been less receptive to habeas 
claims under Napue. In a case dealing with whether shooting 
murders were intentional or accidental, the prosecutor's know-
ing use of an "expert" whose qualifications and diagnosis of the 
defendant were completely fictitious was found immateria1.62 
Because the diagnosis pertained to the probability that the de-
fendant had shot the victims intentionally, there was arguably 
some likelihood that the decision would have affected the jury's 
verdict.63 
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed 
the denial of a petition for habeas corpus based on a prosecu-
tor's failure to correct false testimony regarding a witness's 
immunity.64 However, although the case is similar to Hayes in 
that the false testimony pertained to impeachment of an ac-
complice witness, the Court's decision is more straightforward 
due to the clear falsity of the testimony and the lower court's 
application of the wrong standard.65 Nevertheless, the Court's 
reversal of a capital conviction based on the false accomplice 
testimony pertaining to credibility was in the spirit of the 
Hayes decision. 
59Id. at 1054. 
60 Id. at 1054·55. 
6! Id. 
62 Drake v. Portuondo, 321 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 2003). 
63 See Goldschneider, supra note 56, at 55·56 (arguing that the court's interpre· 
tation of review under the AEDPA led to a finding that the violation was immaterial 
even though reversal was warranted). 
64 Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1458 (11th Cir. 1986). 
65Id. at 1464. 
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Although these cases had different outcomes, both illus-
trate the narrower view of the materiality standard taken in 
other circuits. If the courts had applied the reasoning from 
Hayes, both would have resulted in clear reversals. 
3. Modern Habeas Corpus Review Under theAEDPA 
No discussion of the application of a Supreme Court stan-
dard on federal habeas review can be complete without noting 
the significant impact of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA").66 Under subsection 2254(d)(1) 
of the AEDPA, federal courts may only reverse a conviction if 
the state appellate court's decision is "contrary to, or involved 
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 
law."67 The Supreme Court later held that the "clearly estab-
lished" language referred only to "holdings, as opposed to the 
dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the 
relevant state-court decision."68 The AEDPA has limited the 
ability of federal courts to review independently habeas claims, 
and has been criticized for doing so at the same time that 
wrongful convictions continued to be discovered.69 With the 
chilling effect of the AEDPA as a backdrop, the Ninth Circuit's 
analysis in Hayes becomes even more significant. 
The Ninth Circuit followed the standard and reasoning set 
forth in the Supreme Court cases in reaching its decision in 
Hayes as permitted under the AEDPA.70 Nevertheless, the 
Hayes Court reached a different result than prior reviewing 
courts. The consistently strong disapproval of state misconduct 
in earlier cases indicates that the Hayes Court's conclusion was 
appropriate. 
II. THE HAYES V. BROWN DECISION 
In Hayes, the Ninth Circuit revisited the materiality stan-
66 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104·132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
67 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2006). 
68 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). 
69 See Goldschneider, supra note 56, at 8; see also Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law: 
Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory, and the Nature of Legal Rules, 2 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 535, 539 (1999) (arguing that AEDPA's highly deferential standard has 
"handcuffed" habeas review in federal courts). 
70 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2005). 
9
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dard in analyzing the state's use of false evidence. Its careful 
scrutiny of the facts, coupled with its thorough consideration of 
the materiality of the false testimony, led to the reversal of Mr. 
Hayes's conviction. 
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Vinod "Pete" Patel was murdered at a motel in Stockton, 
California on New Year's Day in 1980.71 Mr. Patel was the mo-
tel's manager, and Blufford Hayes was staying in a room with 
his sister.72 Mr. Hayes's sister later testified that at the time, 
the sink in her room had been leaking and that she had asked 
Mr. Patel to fix it. 73 When she returned from work that day, 
she found Mr. Patel's body in her room.74 Mr. Patel had died as 
a result of multiple stab wounds. 75 
1. The Events of January 1, 1980 According to Blufford Hayes 
Mr. Hayes testified that he went to the motel office to com-
plain to Mr. Patel about the leaky sink, returned to his room 
and went to sleep. 76 He testified that he awoke to someone 
slapping him and realized it was Mr. Patel.77 Allegedly, Mr. 
Patel had a knife and during the struggle, Mr. Hayes stabbed 
him in the arm and chest.78 Mr. Hayes then bound Mr. Patel's 
hands and feet with wire hangers, supposedly to put an end to 
the fight. 79 
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hayes went to the motel room of 
Andrew James, a longtime acquaintance.8o Mr. James shared 
the room with his girlfriend, Michelle Gebert.81 Mr. Hayes 
stated that he needed a ride because he had "downed" some-
one.82 Mr. James said he did not believe it and would go see for 
71 Id. at 974. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 975. 
74 Id. at 976. 
75 Id. 






82 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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himself.S3 However, when Mr. Hayes looked out, Mr. James 
had not gone to the room, but instead was in the motel office.s4 
Mr. Hayes went to the office and found Mr. James taking boxes 
of cigarettes out of the office.s5 They loaded them into Mr. 
James's car and left.s6 
2. The Events of January 1, 1980 According to Andrew James 
Mr. James's testimony differed from that of Mr. Hayes. He 
testified that he left his room with Mr. Hayes.s7 When he ar-
rived at his car, there were already two boxes of cigarettes in-
side.ss Mr. James testified that it was not until they were in 
the car that Mr. Hayes told him that he had "offed" Mr. Pate1.89 
Mr. Hayes stated that Mr. Patel had swung at him and that 
Mr. Hayes had "[done] the do with him."90 Mter he returned to 
the motel, Mr. James discussed what to do with Ms. Gebert.91 
He testified that he had been afraid to go to the police because 
he "had cases at the time," but Ms. Gebert eventually called the 
police.92 
Mr. Hayes was arrested and tried before a jury in San Joa-
quin County.93 By this time, Mr. James had moved to Flor-
ida.94 The prosecution flew him back to California to testify, 
promising that he would be permitted to return afterward.95 At 
the time of his testimony, Mr. James had four felony charges 
pending in California: three counts of felony theft with a prior 
conviction and a charge of being under the influence of her-
oin.96 He also had a history of convictions for theft crimes.97 




86Id. at 975-76. 
87Id. at 976. 






94 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2005). 
95Id. at 976-77. 
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James's attorney agreed to give Mr. James transactional im-
munity for the murder and to dismiss his other pending felo-
nies.98 However, Mr. Van ass insisted that Mr. James not be 
informed about the dismissal of the charges so that he could 
testify that they were still pending.99 Several notes in Mr. 
James's attorney's file established that such a deal was in 
place, that Mr. James need not attend arraignments on the 
charges, and that the charges were to be dismissed at the con-
clusion of Mr. Hayes's trial.100 In addition, the notes revealed 
Mr. Van ass's desire to keep the deal secret.l°1 
After he secured the deal, Mr. Van ass misled both the 
judge and Mr. Hayes's counsel in pretrial hearings by denying 
any such negotiations had occurred.l°2 At trial, Mr. Van ass 
deliberately elicited false testimony from Mr. James that he 
had received no such deal. 103 Defense counsel impeached Mr. 
James with his prior convictions, drug use, and transactional 
immunity.l°4 In closing arguments, the prosecution empha-
sized Mr. James's credibility.l°5 
A jury convicted Mr. Hayes of first-degree murder, bur-
glary, and robbery.lo6 In addition, the jury found two special 
circumstances, burglary-murder and robbery-murder, to be 
true. 107 The Court followed the jury's recommendation and 
sentenced Mr. Hayes to death.l°8 On appeal, the California 
Supreme Court reversed the robbery conviction and the rob-
bery-murder special circumstance.l°9 However, it affirmed Mr. 
Hayes's other convictions and the death sentence.l10 
In 1995, Mr. Hayes filed his first amended petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus in federal court.lll The court held evi-
dentiary hearings both on penalty phase issues and on an inef-
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 2005). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 979·980. 
103 Id. at 980. 
104 Id. at 987. 
105 Id. at 980. 
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fective assistance of counsel claim. ll2 Both parties moved for 
summary judgment and the magistrate judge recommended 
granting the State's motion.113 A district court judge reviewed 
and denied Mr. Hayes's petition.l14 Mter a divided panel af-
firmed the judgment, the Ninth Circuit voted to rehear the de-
cision en banc. ll5 
B. EN BANC NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION 
Judge Thomas, writing for the majority, began by empha-
sizing the Court's disapproval of prosecutorial misconduct. ll6 
He then closely reexamined the facts of the case and conducted 
a thorough analysis of the materiality standard.l17 Judge 
Tallman, who wrote a partial dissent joined by three other 
judges, agreed that Mr. Van Oss's conduct had violated Mr. 
Hayes's constitutional rights.118 However, Tallman refused to 
accept that the false testimony in this case affected the jury's 
verdict, thus finding it immateriaJ.119 
1. The Majority 
The Hayes majority first rejected the Government's conten-
tion that there was no violation of due process because Mr. 
James did not commit perjury.120 The Court held that Napue 
error occurred whenever false evidence was knowingly used, 
regardless of whether the witness committed perjury, noting, 
"[t]his saves [the witness] from perjury, but it does not make 
his testimony truthful."121 In addition, the Court reasoned that 
the affirmative duty set forth in Alcorta and Pyle required 
prosecutors to correct testimony known to be false. 122 There-
fore, the State's misconduct had resulted in a violation of Mr. 




116 Id. at 974. 
117 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 987·89 (9th Cir. 2005). 
118 Id. at 989 (Tallman, J., concurring). 
119 Id. at 989 (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
120 Id. at 980·81 (majority opinion). 
121 Id. at 981 (quoting Willhoite v. Vasquez, 921 F.2d 247, 251 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(Trott, J. concurring». 
122 Id, at 981. 
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Hayes's due process rights under both standards. 
The majority also considered the standard of review that 
should apply in the case.l23 It noted that even when courts find 
constitutional error, there is no per se rule of reversaP24 The 
Court applied the rule from Napue that if there is any reason-
able likelihood that the false evidence affected the jury's ver-
dict, then the conviction cannot stand.l25 It reasoned that the 
Brecht harmless error analysis that generally applied to habeas 
review was unnecessary because a finding of materiality was 
necessarily also a finding that the error was not harmless.l26 
Applying the materiality standard, the Court reached the 
crucial factual conclusion that Mr. James had some knowledge 
that "something was afoot" regarding the "secret" deal. 127 This 
finding was in direct opposition to the Government's factual as-
sertions.l28 The majority reasoned that Mr. James would not 
have risked returning to California without the deal, as he had 
been hesitant to go to the police in the first place because of his 
outstanding charges. 129 
The Court proceeded to consider the likelihood that Mr. 
James's false testimony affected the jury's verdict. 130 First, Mr. 
James's testimony was important to the prosecution's case be-
cause nearly all of the other evidence linking Mr. Hayes to Mr. 
Patel's murder was circumstantiaP31 Additionally, Mr. James 
provided the only evidence that supported the prosecution's 
burglary-murder theory of the case, which was necessary for 
the special circumstances to be found true, and for the death 
sentence to be imposed.132 Finally, Mr. James alone testified 
that Mr. Hayes had actually confessed to killing Mr. PateP33 
Hence, Mr. James was a key prosecution witness and, accord-
ingly, his credibility was a crucial factor for the jury to con-
123 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005). 
124Id. 
125Id. 
126Id. at 984·85. 
127Id. at 987. 
128Id. at 980. 
129 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 987 (9th Cir. 2005). 
130Id. at 985-86. 
131Id. 
132Id. at 986. 
133Id. at 985. 
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sider. 134 
Another significant factor in the Court's decision was its 
finding that the false evidence was non-cumulative. It rea-
soned that the impeachment evidence regarding Mr. James 
that the jury did hear was not as important as what they did 
not hear.135 Since both Mr. Hayes and Mr. James were drug 
users with criminal histories, these facts would not have been 
important to the jury's determination of whom to believe.l36 
Further, the Court reasoned that the transactional immunity 
Mr. James received was also insubstantial because Mr. James 
probably would not have faced charges arising from this case 
anyway.137 Consequently, the Court reasoned that Mr. James's 
false testimony regarding the "secret" deal was non-
cumulative.138 
In addition, the majority noted that the constitutional vio-
lation under the prosecutor's duty to correct false evidence was 
also material.139 It reasoned that had Mr. Van Oss corrected 
Mr. James's false testimony, he would have been forced to re-
veal the details of the "secret" deal, which would likely have 
caused the jury to lose all confidence in the reliability of the 
prosecution.l40 Accordingly, the Court found the prosecutor's 
failure to perform his duty material. 
Finally, the Court noted that this case was not an anom-
aly: numerous cases involving the knowing use of false evi-
dence had recently come before the Court.141 In denouncing 
such conduct, Judge Thomas opined, "[w]hen even a single con-
viction is obtained through perjurious or deceptive means, the 
entire foundation of our system of justice is weakened."142 
2. The Dissent 
Judge Tallman, writing for the four dissenters, concurred 
that the use of false evidence violated Mr. Hayes's due process 
134Id, at 987. 




139Id. at 988. 
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rights, yet he strongly criticized the majority's holding on the 
issue of materiality, arguing that the majority had misapplied 
the standard.l43 However, the dissent's disagreement with the 
majority actually resulted primarily from its acceptance of the 
Government's contention that Mr. James had no knowledge of 
the deal, stating that, "[t]o label the testimony of James 'false' 
is a misnomer on these facts."144 In accepting this version of 
the facts, the dissent reasoned that Mr. James had no further 
incentive to testify, that his credibility remained unchanged, 
and that his testimony regarding the deal was thus immate-
rial.145 
The dissent further argued that the evidence of the "secret" 
deal was cumulative because Mr. James's credibility was suffi-
ciently tested by other evidence.l46 It noted that the jury heard 
of Mr. James's transactional immunity and other favors from 
the State, including money and airline tickets.147 The dissent 
contended that since these factors could have affected Mr. 
James's credibility, the dismissal of the other felonies only 
amounted to cumulative impeachment evidence and was im-
material.148 Therefore, based on its assumption that Mr. James 
knew nothing about the "secret" deal when he testified and 
that the deal would have amounted to cumulative impeach-
ment, the dissent found the majority's conclusions on the mate-
riality issue improper.149 
III. THE COURT'S MATERIALITY ANALYSIS IN HAYES AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
The Ninth Circuit reached its conclusion in Hayes by care-
fully reexamining the facts in deciding whether the false testi-
mony pertaining to Mr. James's credibility was reasonably 
likely to have affected the jury's verdict.150 By engaging in this 
meaningful review of Mr. Hayes's case, the Court granted relief 
while adhering to the materiality standard set forth in Napue 
143Id. at 989 (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
144 Id. at 990. 
145Id. (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
146 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 990 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
147Id. 
148Id. 
149Id. at 991 (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
150Id. at 985·88. 
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and its progeny.151 Accordingly, other courts should follow the 
Hayes majority's materiality analysis to ensure the reversal of 
wrongful convictions caused by prosecutorial misconduct. 
A. THE MAJORITY'S FINDING THAT MR. JAMES HAD SOME 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE "SECRET" DEAL 
The majority's determination that Mr. James must have 
known that "something was afoot" regarding his pending felo-
nies, and its finding that the "secret" deal was in all likelihood 
not secret, were crucial to its holding on materiality.152 Despite 
both the Government's and the dissent's insistence that Mr. 
James was unaware of the deal, the majority reexamined the 
facts and reached a different and more logical conclusion that 
ultimately led to reversal. 
1. Mr. James's Return from California 
In the intervening period between the murder of Pete Patel 
and the prosecution of Mr. Hayes, Mr. James had moved from 
California to Florida. 153 In spite of his pending felonies in Cali-
fornia, Mr. James agreed to reenter the jurisdiction to testify in 
Mr. Hayes's murder trial.154 Not only was it likely that Mr. 
James relocated to Florida because he was a "wanted man" in 
California, but it was highly improbable that he decided to re-
turn without any promise that he would not be arrested. Mr. 
Van Oss's promise that Mr. James could return to Florida after 
testifying would have indicated to Mr. James that he need not 
worry about being prosecuted for his pending felonies. Fur-
ther, Mr. James's testimony in the Hayes trial revealed his con-
cerns about his pending charges. 155 He stated that when he 
discussed what to do about the murder with Ms. Gebert, he ex-
pressed his fear of calling the police due to his pending felo-
nies.156 Hence, Mr. James' testimony indicated that from the 
outset he was concerned with being involved in the case due to 
151 Id.; Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); United States v. Agurs, 
427 U.S. 97,103-04 (1976); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959). 
152 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 987 (9th Cir. 2005). 
153Id. at 979. 
154Id. 
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his own problems with the law. The majority recognized that 
the only logical explanation for Mr. James's cooperation was 
his expectation that he would face neither immediate incar-
ceration upon his return,157 nor years in prison after being con-
victed of the pending charges. 158 Thus, the Court concluded 
that Mr. James had at least some knowledge of the deal. 
2. The Indicia of Special Treatment 
The Court's reasoning that Mr. James could not have over-
looked the special treatment he received as soon as he became 
involved in the Hayes case was a logical conclusion drawn from 
the facts. First, Mr. James was not arrested, incarcerated or 
even arraigned on his pending felonies throughout his twenty-
two-month-Iong involvement in the case,159 In addition, he did 
not attend a single court appearance for those charges and suf-
fered no repercussions as a result,160 Mr. James had been in-
volved in the criminal justice system on numerous prior occa-
sions and would have known that it was unusual not to be 
required to appear at court proceedings. 161 Surely his attorney 
provided him with an explanation of why he need not attend 
any of these proceedings. Hence, the Court properly concluded 
that either by his attorney's words or conduct, Mr. James had 
knowledge of the deal. 
The majority determined that Mr. James's knowledge that 
he would not be prosecuted for his pending felonies was the 
logical conclusion based on the facts of this case. Since the 
knowledge that he would not face jail time was likely the deci-
sive factor in Mr. James's decision to come to California and 
testify against Mr. Hayes, it was a fact the jury should have 
157 See First Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Hayes v. Brown, 399 
F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hayes Habeas], at 56; see also 
Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2002). At the time, Mr. James was on pro-
bation. Therefore, by reentering California, he could have been incarcerated immedi-
ately for violating probation, and would have remained so pending the outcome of his 
current felony charges. 
158 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 987 (9th Cir. 2005). 
159 See Hayes Habeas, supra note 157, at 58-60. Mr. James's arraignment was 
continued on twelve separate occasions during proceedings against Mr. Hayes, from 
February 1980 to December 1981. Neither Mr. James nor his attorney appeared at any 
of these proceedings. 
160 See id. 
161 See Hayes, 399 F.3d at 977. 
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heard in determining his credibility. The Court's close factual 
analysis led it to reject unconvincing assertions that Mr. James 
was kept in the dark. In this way, the majority was able to 
avoid the troubling implications of the Government's material-
ity argument, which essentially asserted that precisely because 
they had kept the truth from the Court and the witness, the 
Government should be found not to have influenced the out-
come. 
B. THE MATERIALITY OF THE FALSE TESTIMONY AND THE 
PROSECUTOR'S F AlLURE TO CORRECT IT 
The Ninth Circuit's close analysis of Mr. Van Oss's mis-
conduct under the "any reasonable likelihood" standard set 
forth in Napue and its progeny led to the Court's reversal when 
previous reviewing courts had affirmed. Under the assumption 
that Mr. James must have had some awareness of the "secret" 
deal, the Court examined both the importance of his false tes-
timony to the prosecution's theory of the case, and whether or 
not impeaching Mr. James with this deal would have been cu-
mulative. 162 Finally, the Court considered the likely outcome of 
the case had the prosecutor performed his duty of correcting 
the false testimony.163 By carefully considering whether these 
factors would have affected the jury's verdict, the Court applied 
the materiality standard in the manner contemplated by the 
Supreme Court when prosecutors engage in intentional mis-
conduct. 164 
1. The Importance of Mr. James's Testimony to the 
Prosecution's Theory of the Case 
A key factor the Hayes Court considered in applying the 
materiality standard was the importance of Mr. James's testi-
mony to the prosecution. It concluded that whether or not the 
jury took Mr. James's word over that of Mr. Hayes was deter-
minative of the outcome of the triaP65 Accordingly, the false 
testimony that bolstered Mr. James's credibility was material. 
162 [d. at 986. 
163 [d. at 988. 
164 See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 270 (1959), and Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). 
165 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 986 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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Mr. James testified to several facts that were critical to the 
prosecution's case. First, he was the only person who testified 
that Mr. Hayes confessed to the murder.166 In addition, his tes-
timony supported the prosecution's theory of burglary and 
murder that led to Mr. Hayes's conviction and death sen-
tence. 167 Specifically, the State had to prove Mr. Hayes's intent 
to commit burglary.168 Because there was conflicting testimony 
regarding who burglarized the office, the State's case depended 
on the jury accepting Mr. James's version of events.169 The jury 
had to believe that Mr. Hayes committed the burglary in order 
to find the special circumstance true and to impose a death 
sentence.170 By identifying the necessity of Mr. James's testi-
mony to the prosecution's case, the Court concluded that it was 
material. 
On the other hand, the prosecutor's withholding of a deal 
with a less important witness may not have had a material ef-
fect on the verdict because the jury could have reached its deci-
sion without finding the witness credible. However, the Hayes 
case turned on whether Mr. James was more credible than Mr. 
Hayes. Both defense counsel and prosecutor Van Oss empha-
sized this fact in closing arguments: the former stating, "[i]n 
this case, you can only conclude that [Mr. Hayes] committed a 
robbery or a burglary if you believe Andrew James beyond a 
reasonable doubt ... "171 and the latter arguing, "Andrew James 
may be a very bad man, he may have a bad past, he is not a 
murderer as the defendant is in this case."172 The Court's con-
sideration of the importance of Mr. James's testimony to the 
prosecution's case supported its finding that the false evidence 
was material. 
2. The Court's Finding That the "Secret" Deal Was Not 
Cumulative 
Another key factor in the majority's finding of materiality 
was its conclusion that Mr. James's false testimony was non-
166Id. at 985. 
167 Id. at 985-86. 
168Id. at 985. 
169Id. 
170 See id. at 986. 
171 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 986 (9th Cir. 2005). 
172 Id. at 980. 
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cumulative. The dissenters in Hayes argued that withholding 
the "secret" deal from the jury was immaterial because Mr. 
James had already been impeached with his transactional im-
munity, criminal history, and other favors provided by the 
State.l73 However, by distinguishing the "secret" deal from the 
other impeachment evidence, the majority reached a different 
and sounder conclusion. 
a. The (In)significance of Mr. James's Transactional 
Immunity 
The Court reasoned that a charge against Mr. James in the 
Patel murder was unlikely, thus making his transactional im-
munity an unpersuasive factor in deciding his credibility. It 
reasoned that no theory of the case, including the one set forth 
by Mr. Hayes himself, implicated Mr. James in the murder of 
Mr. Patel.174 According to Mr. Hayes, he had stabbed Mr. Patel 
in self-defense.!75 According to the prosecution, Mr. Hayes 
killed Mr. Patel as part of a plan to commit burglary.l76 In ei-
ther scenario, Mr. James was not involved in Mr. Patel's death, 
and therefore did not risk being charged with his murder. 
Although testimony at the Hayes trial did implicate Mr. 
James in the burglary, a burglary charge would have been 
tenuous at best. Mr. Hayes testified that Mr. James had gone 
down to the motel office on his own and had taken the ciga-
rettes, and another witness testified that she had seen Mr. 
James carrying boxes to his car.!77 According to his own testi-
mony, Mr. James may have been an accessory to the burglary 
by giving Mr. Hayes a ride with the stolen goods.l78 However, a 
charge of burglary based on these facts would not only have 
been difficult to prove, but would have contradicted the State's 
theory in the Hayes case. Since the prosecution contended that 
Mr. Hayes murdered Mr. Patel in order to commit burglary, 
charging Mr. James conflicted with the prosecution's interest 
in seeking the death penalty. The majority recognized that the 
prosecution's theory of felony-murder precluded its charging 
173 [d. at 990 (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
174 [d. at 972. 
175 [d. 
176 [d. at 985-86. 
177 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972,975-76 (9th Cir. 2005). 
178 [d. at 976. 
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Mr. James with burglaryJ79 By distinguishing between the 
likely effect on the jury of Mr. James's transactional immunity 
from that of the "secret" deal, the Court found the latter non-
cumulative, and thus material. 180 
b. The Court's Conclusion That Mr. James' Impeachment 
with His Prior Convictions Was Non-Cumulative 
The Court noted that because both Mr. James and Mr. 
Hayes had similar pasts, their impeachments at trial with 
their prior drug use and criminal histories were unlikely to 
significantly affect the jury's reasoning.181 In essence, the un-
savory pasts of Mr. Hayes and Mr. James served to equalize 
them in the jury's eyes in terms of their moral characters. 
Therefore, the knowledge that Mr. James had an added incen-
tive to lie in this case might have changed the jury's impression 
of his credibility. The Court's comparison of the characters of 
both Mr. James and Mr. Hayes allowed it to conclude that the 
impeachment for prior convictions and drug use did not render 
the "secret" deal cumulative. 
3. The Materiality of Mr. Van Oss's Failure to Correct False 
Testimony 
By considering the outcome of the trial had Mr. Van Oss 
performed his duty to correct Mr. James's false testimony, the 
Court recognized another theory for a finding of materiality.182 
The Hayes majority first considered the materiality of Mr. Van 
Oss's failure to correct Mr. James's false testimony regarding 
his pending felonies.183 More significantly, it also considered 
the impact on the jury if Van Oss had corrected Mr. James's 
testimony, which would have required revealing the "secret" 
deal to the jury.184 In recognizing the devastating impact this 
would have had on the State's case, the Court found that this 
179 Id. at 985. 
180 See supra notes 57·61 and accompanying text. Although Lambert involved a 
Brady violation and was not cited in Hayes, it engaged in a similar analysis in finding 
undisclosed evidence non-cumulative. 
181 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 987 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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constitutional error was also material.185 Although the Court 
did not ultimately rely on this reasoning to reach its conclusion 
to grant relief, the discussion indicated the Court's approval for 
considering this issue. Because the prosecution has a duty to 
correct false evidence, it follows that a court should consider 
the impact on the jury of fulfilling that duty, as the Court did 
in Hayes. Thus, this reasoning may be useful in finding mate-
riality for the knowing presentation of false evidence in future 
cases. 
The depth of the Ninth Circuit majority's analysis allowed 
the Court to reach its decision to grant Mr. Hayes a new trial. 
Moreover, its application of facts and law in Hayes demon-
strated a commitment to taking allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct seriously. Other courts should adhere to the 
Court's reasoning to address the problem of wrongful convic-
tions. 
C. THE HAYES DECISION'S POSITIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR 
PREVENTING AND REVERSING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
Prosecutorial misconduct has emerged as a troubling and 
significant cause of wrongful convictions.l86 In addition, per-
jured testimony of prosecution witnesses-particularly accom-
plices-is also to blame in many of these cases.187 However, an 
examination of the Hayes Court's materiality analysis reveals 
several positive implications for addressing these issues. First, 
in light of the limitations on habeas review, the lack of prosecu-
tion discipline, and the absence of other remedies for wrongful 
convictions, courts must engage in a meaningful application of 
the materiality standard when there are allegations of prosecu-
torial misconduct and the use of false evidence.188 Second, 
courts must focus, as did the Ninth Circuit, on the prosecutor's 
duty to correct testimony regarding a deal with a witness, 
whether express or implied, to prevent wrongful convictions by 
encouraging prosecutors to make sure the testimony of accom-
plice witnesses is truthful and correcting it when it is not.189 
Finally, courts should follow the Ninth Circuit's materiality 
185Id. 
186 See supra notes 2·4 and accompanying text. 
187 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
188 See infra notes 191·202 and accompanying text. 
189 See infra notes 203-206 and accompanying text. 
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analysis and its reluctance to accept the Government's asser-
tions to reverse wrongful convictions resulting from state mis-
conduct. 190 
1. The Need for Meaningful Review of Cases Alleging 
Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Use of False Testimony to 
Address Wrongful Convictions 
In their book, Actual Innocence, the founders of the Inno-
cence Project begin the chapter on prosecutorial misconduct by 
emphasizing courts' resistance to reversal: "[f]or an innocent 
person, the two most dangerous words in the language of the 
law are 'harmless error."'191 They explain that appellate courts 
use these "magic words" to "absolve ... prosecutors of miscon-
duct."192 The authors go on to describe numerous cases in 
which prosecutors engaged in misconduct that was found 
harmless by the courts, yet the defendants were later exoner-
ated based on DNA evidence. 193 In the context of a prosecutor's 
knowing use of false evidence, a court finding a violation imma-
terial is analogous to it finding the error harmless. 194 
This reluctance by reviewing courts to meaningfully exam-
ine cases of misconduct,195 coupled with the chilling effect that 
the AEDPA has had on federal habeas review,196 has created a 
harsh climate in which the wrongfully convicted must plead 
their cases. Thus, carefully applying the established Supreme 
Court standards that are available on habeas review has be-
come even more important. The reversal in the Hayes case il-
lustrates the difference that courts can make when such a close 
analysis is applied. For example, the Ninth Circuit's careful 
consideration of each piece of impeachment evidence led to its 
conclusion that the "secret" deal was non-cumulative and thus 
material. 197 
In addition, as reversals continue to occur based on DNA 
190 See supra notes 152·161 and accompanying text. 
191 BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN 
JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND How TO MAKE IT RIGHT 172 (New American Library 2001). 
192Id. 
193Id. at 172-74. 
194 See supra notes 30 and 125-126 and accompanying text. 
195 See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. 
196 See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. 
197 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 988 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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evidence, it becomes apparent that far more innocent persons 
are incarcerated whose alleged crime did not create this type of 
evidence. Although numerous proposals have been made for 
remedying wrongful convictions,198 few thus far have been im-
plemented. Hence, granting reversal on habeas review based 
on due process violations continues to be a vital remedy in 
overturning wrongful convictions in spite of the breakthroughs 
in scientific evidence. 
Another important reason for a close analysis of cases im-
plicating the materiality standard is the lack of prosecutorial 
discipline for misconduct. 199 With rare exception, no prosecu-
tors have been disciplined for their roles in wrongful convic-
tions, even in those cases in which the misconduct was deemed 
grossly negligent or intentional. 200 In fact, in almost all cases 
in which prosecutorial misconduct was found, no discipline was 
imposed.201 Consequently, little deterrence exists in terms of 
damage to prosecutors' careers or reputations. To illustrate, 
prosecutor Van Oss is now Superior Court Judge Van Oss in 
the same county where he lied to the judge and jury during the 
proceedings against Mr. Hayes decades earlier.202 In light of 
these circumstances, adjudication of habeas claims based on al-
legations of misconduct is one of the only avenues through 
which courts review a prosecutor's actions. Accordingly, courts 
have a duty to do so meaningfully. 
2. Use of the Ninth Circuit's Materiality Standard to Prevent 
and Reverse Wrongful Convictions Based on False 
Testimony 
In Hayes, the Court considered not only the materiality of 
198 See Ellen Yaroshefsy, Wrongful Convictions: It is Time to Take Prosecution 
Discipline Seriously, 8 UDC L. REV. 275, 278 (2004) (proposing the creation of inno-
cence commissions); see also Sam Roberts, Note, Should Prosecutors be Required to Re-
cord Their Pretrial Interviews with Accomplices and Snitches?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
257, 262 (2005) (proposing recording all pretrial meetings between police, prosecutors 
and cooperating accomplices and snitches). 
199 See Yaroshefsy, supra note 198, at 278·79. 
200 See id. 
201 See id. at 277. (finding that prosecutors are rarely disciplined even for miscon-
duct that is considered "highly reprehensible," such as suppressing facts and secreting 
evidence). 
202 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2005); San Joaquin County Supe-
rior Court, Judicial Officers of the Superior Court, at 
http://www.stocktoncourt.org/courts/peoplel.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2006). 
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the false testimony regarding the "secret" deal, but also the 
impact the prosecutor's correction would have had on the ver-
dict.203 This new factor in considering the prosecutor's duty to 
correct gives "teeth" to this standard by taking into account 
how such a correction would affect the credibility of the prose-
cution in the eyes of the jury. Although commentators already 
view this duty to correct as discouraging prosecutors from us-
ing false testimony, this added factor could further deter prose-
cutors from using testimony that is likely perjured.204 Fur-
thermore, the duty to correct can also help address the general 
problem of perjured testimony as prosecutors may take more 
seriously the possibility that witnesses are not being com-
pletely truthful about the incentives they have received for 
their testimony.205 Therefore, the Court's reinforcement of the 
duty to correct and its focus on the consequences of not fulfill-
ing that duty may help address the problem of wrongful convic-
tions caused by perjury and prosecutorial misconduct. 
The Hayes Court's unwillingness to accept the Govern-
ment's assertions regarding the "secret" deal may further deter 
prosecutors from concealing incentives or allowing potentially 
false testimony to go uncorrected.206 This suspicion is logical: 
when a court reaches the question of materiality, it has already 
established that the prosecution has engaged in misconduct of 
constitutional magnitude. Therefore, to rely on the State or the 
Government's version of the facts is to accept the view of per-
sons who have already demonstrated that they are capable of 
deceit. If other courts review such claims similar to the review 
by the Ninth Circuit, the prosecutor's word may be insufficient 
if a court's factual analysis leads it to conclude otherwise. 
Therefore, the Ninth's Circuit's decision in Hayes may further 
203 See supra notes 182·185 and accompanying text. 
204 See R. Michael Cassidy, "Soft Words of Hope:" Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, 
and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1129, 1163-64 (2004) (argu-
ing that although greater restrictions should be implemented to prevent a prosecutor's 
complicity in perjury, Napue's duty to correct false testimony can help reveal induce-
ments prosecutors give to cooperating witnesses in exchange for their testimony); see 
also Roberts, supra note 198, at 267 (noting that although prosecutors are not required 
to record interviews with cooperating and accomplice witnesses, their affirmative duty 
to correct false testimony is one due process protection for defendants). 
205 See Cassidy, supra note 204 and accompanying text; see also Bennett L. 
Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 324, 337-38 
(asserting that in addition to the prosecutor's duty not subvert the truth, prosecutors 
have a duty to prejudge whether witness testimony is truthful). 
206 See supra notes 156-162 and accompanying text. 
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instruct prosecutors to take greater care in both gwmg in-
ducements to witnesses and correcting their testimony at trial. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Rarely is a defendant fortunate enough to obtain signed 
statements from a prosecutor and a perjurious witness attest-
ing to the unfairness of the trial, as was the case in Pyle u. 
Kansas. 207 In most cases, the parties dispute the facts sur-
rounding the misconduct and courts must make determinations 
based on those facts that are available. However, courts should 
examine every fact at their disposal and thoroughly consider 
materiality without a bias towards the Government if they are 
serious about addressing the problem of wrongful convictions. 
The profoundly worrisome statistics linking prosecutorial mis-
conduct and false testimony to wrongful convictions indicate 
that subsequent courts should follow the majority's analysis in 
Hayes. 208 
Although the Supreme Court requires that the materiality 
standard be met in order for a defendant to be granted relief in 
cases involving a prosecutor's knowing use of false evidence,209 
the Hayes case illustrates that a court's willingness to mean-
ingfully apply this standard can make the difference between 
affirmance and reversal. Only Mr. James and Mr. Hayes know 
precisely what happened on January 1, 1980, but the Ninth 
Circuit properly found that regardless, the prosecutor's actions 
caused Mr. Hayes to be sentenced to death without a fair trial. 
Accordingly, courts must carefully consider cases involving 
such allegations to ensure that this standard does not become a 
barrier to justice that allows wrongful convictions to stand and 
emboldens prosecutors to obtain convictions at any cost. 
Hence, courts must follow the Ninth Circuit's lead to confront 
the issues of prosecutorial misconduct and wrongful convictions 
and to maintain the integrity of the criminal justice system. 
207 Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215 (1942). 
208 See supra notes 2·4 and accompanying text. 
209 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). 
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